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I. INTRODUCTION 
California's energy crisis represented a profound moment in 
energy policy, crisis management and environmental justice. 
California's deregulation led to blackouts and rapid increases in 
ratepayer bills that eventually fueled the Governor's declaration 
of emergency and emergency legislation by the State Legislature. 
Lessons about deregulation, crisis management and 
environmental justice abound. 
This article is not an attempt to systematically and 
comprehensively analyze California's energy deregulation. It 
instead focuses on the repercussions of crisis management, 
particularly as it relates to environmental justice. 
There are implications for our society beyond energy policy in 
California's energy experiment, especially at a time of national 
crisis management to address the terrorist threat. Even in a 
state that prided itself on its progressiveness and demographic 
diversity, people of color were the first to suffer in a time of crisis. 
At the same time, democratic rights such as public participation 
in environmental decision-making were easily eroded. Even 
more alarming, after the crisis abated, governmental leaders 
empowered by emergency authority are now resisting giving up 
their new power. Now it appears that mistakes made in the 
crisis will have consequences far into the future. 
II. CALIFORNIA'S DEREGULATION EXPERIMENT 
California's deregulation scheme was superficially brilliant in 
design, though fatally flawed. The basic goal was to reduce 
prices. l While historically, one could question the need to fix a 
system that had dramatically reduced energy prices over one 
hundred years,2 California's prices remained relatively high, and 
business in particular, welcomed the siren's call that competition 
could reduce prices still further.3 
1 See California Public Utilities Commission, The California Public Utilities 
Commission Answers 
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/statiC/industry/electric/electric+restructuringlhistorical 
+informationlfaqs.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002). 
2 See Figure 1, Average residential price of electricity, 1892 to 1997 in Hirsh 
and Serchuk, Power Switch, Will the Restructured Electric Utility System Help 
the Environment, 41 Environment 7 at 4-9 (1999). 
3 The California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") estimated that 
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California's deregulation was ushered in by the California 
Legislature through Assembly Bill 1890 on September 23, 19964 
and by the State's Public Utilities Commission (Preferred Policy 
Decision (D.95-12-063, as modified by D.96-01-009). Its primary 
feature was to have the sale and pricing of electricity 
deregulated.5 California's business would have direct access to 
generators of electricity. Prices were to be deregulated over a 
four-year period oftime.6 To assure that competition would drive 
prices down, a substantial portion (at least 50%) of fossil fuel 
power generation (nuclear and hydroelectric were excluded) was 
ordered to be divested from regulated utilities. Further, to 
encourage new investment in new generation, anyone would be 
allowed to set up a power plant without a showing that it was 
needed, as under the old regulatory regime. At the same time, 
brokers would be allowed to purchase electricity and sell it retail 
to consumers or businesses directly. A power exchange, managed 
by a non-profit board, would conduct a market where electricity 
could be bought and sold. Except for direct access for business, 
long-term contracts were not allowed to foster competition. 
In addition, to protect utility shareholders whose regulated 
capital investments may not have been appropriate for a 
deregulated market, a stranded assets account was created to 
repay utilities for assets that would be undervalued by the 
market.7 To fund the account, the legislature authorized a 
transition charge paid by ratepayers, based upon the assumption 
that the assets were worth about twenty-eight billion dollars. If 
the assets were sold and the proceeds were more than estimated, 
the excess amount would be returned to the account to the 
benefit ofratepayers.8 
national electricity costs were 30-50% lower than California's prior to 
deregulation. CPUC, How Electric Industry Change Affects You 
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/staticf.mdustry/electridelectric+restructuringlhistorical 
+informationlplain.htm> (accessed Feb. 18, 2002). 
4 See Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Sept. 23, 1996) available 
online at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/publ95-961billlasmlab_1851-
1900/ab_1890_bill_960924_chaptered.pdf> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002). 
5 In fact California was not purely deregulated. Among other things, as 
discussed below, while the State's control receded, the federal government 
through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission retained authority to 
regulate prices. 
6 See Hirsch, supra n. 2. 
7 Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. at §10(s). 
8 Id. (outlining the charges associating the transition to a competitive 
generation market). 
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To protect ratepayers from these additional costs, a rate 
reduction of 10% and freeze were implemented until the market 
was created and prices were fully deregulated.9 The freeze was 
financed through the issuance of $6.6 billion in bonds.1O To 
protect alternative generation suppliers (e.g., wind and solar) 
who could not initially compete in an open market, the 
legislature authorized transitional subsidies in the amount of 
$540 million that would be phased out over a five-year period as 
the market was implemented,u 
Finally, to assure reliability, the Legislature created a non-
profit Independent System Operator ("ISO"), governed by a board 
of utilities, brokers, consumers and businesses, to manage the 
grid. 12 The ISO would assure the day-to-day operations of the 
grid as well as oversee the maintenance and expansion of 
transmission systems.13 The utilities would still own and 
maintain the transmission systems under ISO oversight and be 
responsible to assure that electricity was distributed to 
businesses and homes, however, in order to receive their 
transition charges they had to submit control of their 
transmission systems to the ISO.14 
Thus everyone won. Business and residents would have 
multiple sellers in a competitive market driving down prices. 
Utilities would have their stranded costs paid for by ratepayers 
and taxpayers. Residents would be assured that the payoff of 
stranded costs would not increase prices in the short-run and 
competition would control prices in the long run. Non-utility 
generators were assured they could get into the market without 
monopoly control from the old utilities and with little regulation. 
Brokers were free to buy and sell electricity.15 Alternative 
generators were given a cushion to ease transition into a market 
economy. 
There were major flaws in this well-crafted program. First, 
9 Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. at § 1(b)(2); see also Hirsch, 
supra n. 2. 
10 Id. at § 8(3)(b) (noting that the total amount of rate reduction bonds 
should not exceed ten billion dollars). 
11 Id. at §10, Art. 381(c)(3) (describing funding for operation and 
development). 
12 See generally Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (providing insight 
about the creation ofISO and its function). 
13 Id. (listing general obligations and duties of the ISO). 
14 See Id. at § 12 (referencing the control of the ISO over publicly owned 
utilities). 
15 Id. at §10 (defining brokers' abilities). 
2002] CALIFORNIA'S ENERGY CRISIS 5 
there was a nalve assumption regarding the requirements for a 
functioning electricity market. Markets require efficiency to 
produce stable prices. IS Efficiency requires sufficient 
participants, sufficient products and ease in distributing 
products. The converse is that a small number of participants 
who have monopoly control over the distribution of products in a 
situation of scarcity can dramatically affect the market (market 
power). 
In California, the margin between electrical supply and 
demand during peak demand hours is razor thin. Even with 
divestment, a small number of companies dominate power 
supply. By 1999 approximately two-thirds of private utility 
assets had been sold to private companies. Diversified, global, 
out-of-state-headquartered corporations (AES, Houston, 
Southern, NRG, Dynegy, and Duke) owned eighty-eight percent 
of these assets. Only seven percent was divested to a California 
company, Calpine-a San Jose based business focused on 
relatively clean energy technologies, combine-cycle natural gas 
and geothermal, though its output through construction of new 
power plants is rapidly expanding.17 
Power supply is constrained by a congested transmission 
system that cannot efficiently deliver electricity from everywhere 
to everywhere in the state, let alone across the country. The 
result is that if one or more companies withhold electricity 
during peak hours, whether due to planned or unplanned 
maintenance or attempts to game the market, prices can 
skyrocket. 
Secondly, there was a failure to fully grasp the impact of a 
dramatic change in electrical policy in a climate of regulated 
monopolies. Once it became apparent that California was 
heading towards deregulation, the utilities had no incentive to 
build power plants. At the same time, an outside company was 
faced with too much uncertainty until deregulation was 
hammered out in the legislature to commit to investing. The 
result was that few power-generating facilities were built in the 
decade before deregulation. 
This problem would not have been an issue if conservation 
proceeded apace. But while deregulation provided subsidies to 
16 See California Energy Commission, Electric Generation Diuestiture in 
California <http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/divestiture.html> (accessed 
Jan. 28, 2000). 
17Id. 
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alternative companies, it removed the incentive for utilities to 
fund conservation efforts. Conservation spending took a nose-
dive after deregulation. It eroded state commitments to demand 
side management ("DSM") even before its formal onset in 1998: 
After the CPUC announcement in 1994 of the transition to 
restructuring, uncertainty about the future of DSM incentives led 
the utilities to dramatically cut DSM budgets. In 1996, AB 1890 
set annual funding at this relatively lower level.18 
Statewide funding for utility DSM programs peaked at $500M 
in 1994, and was down to $270 M by 1999. As a result, the 
California Energy Commission ("CEC") found "the contribution of 
energy efficiency programs to reduce demand continues to 
decline." 19 
The deregulation effort to protect, if not promote renewables 
was similarly flawed. Renewables already had taken a 
substantial blow from the onset of deregulation. Investors and 
operators saw little need to support such production based upon 
the expected price fall under deregulation that would make 
renewables uncompetitive. Deregulation statutes had allocated 
$540 million for the transition period, less than two percent of 
the funds allocated to bailout the regulated utilities from their 
stranded costs. As stated by two key energy advisors to the 
Governor, Michael Kahn (Electricity Oversight Board chairman) 
and Loretta Lynch (CPUC chairperson): 
In the AB 1890 negotiations, proponents of renewable energy 
supplies and energy efficiency won legislated funding for 
energy efficiency renewable resources. However, pursuing a 
competitive market structure, policy makers made funding for 
these programs a low priority. The current funding for these 
programs is almost 70% less than it was in the early 1980s.20 
The result was a process that discouraged the building of 
power generation, provided no incentives to improve the 
18 CEC, California Energy Outlook 2001 
<www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/divestiture> (accessed Mar. 6, 2001). 
19 Id. 
20 Michael Kahn and Loretta Lynch. California's Electricity Options and 
Challenges: Report to Governor Gray Davis (Summer 2000) at § 4; see also 
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedlreportlGOV_REPORT.htm#TopOfPage> 
(accessed Apr. 21 2002). 
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transmission system, dampened conservation and the 
development of alternative renewable sources, and allowed power 
generators to dramatically affect prices to their profit. Instead of 
a market, the pieces were in place to assure blackouts, not only 
at a peak demand period in the summer but in the dead of 
winter. 
The one safeguard built into deregulation was the authority 
vested in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") 
to assure reasonable prices.21 However, FERC was governed by a 
board that was ideologically fixed on the market solving all 
problems.22 FERC failed to control prices at peak periods until it 
was too late, guaranteeing an incentive for those whom 
intentionally or accidentally withheld power in those moments.23 
FERC actions underscored a fundamental misunderstanding 
about electricity. Electricity may be a commodity that ought to 
be suitable for a market, but it is also a necessity. Low-income 
elderly individuals on fixed incomes may die during the winter 
months if the elderly forego payment of their utility bills to save 
money for groceries. Small businesses may be bankrupt in a 
week if utility bills skyrocket. Unlike pencils or apples or tennis 
rackets, electricity may not be ignored or substituted for if prices 
skyrocket, providing a market control over volatility. Demand is 
inelastic, providing the opportunity for a dramatic increase in 
price if supply slackens. 
Equally important, electricity being a necessity becomes a 
political issue. Politicians will not stand by, waiting for the 
market volatility to subside before acting. Electricity was thus ill 
suited for traditional and uncontrolled market economics. It is 
no wonder that California's brand of deregulation failed and 
government eventually stepped in to stop the hemorrhaging. 
III. CALIFORNIA'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
While the question of whether Governor Davis waited too long 
to respond is beyond the scope of this article, the main point is 
21 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(e); see also In Re California Power Exchange, 245 F.3d 
1110 (9th Cir. 2001). 
22 See Marshall Wilson and Zachery Coile, Start Digging, Energy Chief Tells 
State; He says new power plants, not prices caps are the answer, The S.F. Chron. 
A3 (Apr. 12, 2001); see generally Lynda Gledhill and Robert Salladay, Dauis 
Threatens to Sue Regulators to Get Price Limits, The S.F. Chron. A8 (May 30, 
2001). 
23 See San Diego Electric Co., FERC P61, 275 (May 25, 2001) (discussing 
FERC's eventual attempts to control prices). 
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that eventually he did respond. He responded by proclaiming 
pursuant to his authority under Government Code § 8550 et seq., 
a state of emergency on January 17, 2001.24 He soon followed 
with several executive orders.25 
The declaration of emergency and several of the Governor's 
executive orders required the rapid progression of power plant 
licensing. Indeed, once the Governor declares an emergency 
regarding energy supply, the Energy Commission has the 
authority to "authorize the construction and use of generating 
facilities under such terms and conditions as specified by the 
commission to protect the public interest."26 Thus the Governor's 
declaration opened the door for disregarding all procedural and 
substantive safeguards in power plant licensing. 
To address the possibility of price gouging, Governor Davis 
sought price caps and refunds at FERC and had his attorney 
general investigate the withholding of capacity at critical 
moments resulting in blackouts. To address a growth in the 
demand for electricity, Davis and the state legislature took 
various measures to provide incentives for conservation and 
launched a public information campaign. The Governor's Public 
Utilities Commission also ended the price freeze with new rates 
that not only provided additional revenues for utilities now 
facing bankruptcy, but also, provided an additional disincentive 
for wasteful usage of electricity. To address price volatility, his 
Department of Water Resources signed new long-term contracts 
at a price well below peak prices but way above historical prices. 
All of these steps seem reasonable. However upon closer 
examination many of the steps are quite disturbing. The long-
term contracts, for example, did not include any escape clause if 
prices radically changed. In fact, prices have come dramatically 
down, yet Californians must now pay for electricity that no one 
needs at prices way above market value.27 
However, particularly of concern in this article are the 
24 Governor Davis, Executive Order D-40-01 
<http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsitelmsdocslpress_releaselproc_EO_40.doc> 
(accessed Mar. 6, 2002). 
25 Welcome to California <http://www.governor.ca.gov> (accessed Mar. 6, 
2002) (listing recent executive orders through the press room link). 
26 Cal. Pub. Res. Code §25705 (West 2002). 
27 Mark Martin and Lynda Gledhill, The Energy Crunch A Year Later; Paying 
the price of power: After the state spends billions, PG&E faces bankruptcy and 
rates soar, the cost of keeping the lights on hits home, The S.F. Chron. Al (Dec. 
23,2001). 
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emergency orders and legislation that was adopted and still in 
effect speeding up power plant licensing, even now as the crisis 
ebbs. The effect of these orders has been to bank California's 
energy portfolio upon privately owned natural gas-powered 
power plants,28 disproportionately in communities of color. Siting 
decisions are further being made without meaningful public 
participation and with fewer environmental protections. As a 
result of the Governor's approach, California's energy future will 
be leveraged upon one source of polluting fuel, dominated by 
private companies still operating in a deregulated though not as 
free market. 
IV. THE REAL REASON FOR BLACKOUTS 
All of the evidence now available points to the underlying 
causes of blackouts in California. Energy assets that were 
available were oflline and the rest could not efficiently distribute 
their electricity through inadequate transmission lines. The 
reasons for facilities being oflline are in dispute-necessary 
maintenance being the main excuse that is offered by power 
companies. Whether the blackout occurred at a low demand time 
in December or a high demand in June, the issue was a 
mismatch of available supply and demand, not an absolute lack 
of supply: 
The lights went out in the Bay Area in part because nine 
power plants were out of service, either for scheduled 
maintenance or repairs, or were operating at limited 
capacity. PG&E could not import enough power to make up 
for the lost generation because the region has limited 
transmission facilities over which to import power.29 
Indeed California recorded high prices even in the low 
demand month of December. December 2000 wholesale prices hit 
$425.59, more than ten times the amount in the previous year, 
and about double the price just a few months before at the height 
of the hot summer months in August, when peak usage was 
28 See Roberta Mendonca, Presentation-April 15, 1999 Santa Teresa Citizen 
Action Group <http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl1999-04-
15-public_adviser.html> Oast updated July 19, 2001) (noting that prior to 
deregulation California had a diverse portfolio of energy sources: 30% natural 
gas, 21% coal, 23% large hydroelectric, 15% nuclear and 11% renewable). 
29 See 16 U.S.C. § 5. 
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about 20% greater.30 
What explains the December 2000 peak, when a Stage 3 alert 
was called? Power producers had taken 8,988 megawatts (MW) 
off-line, a substantial sum considering that peak usage at that 
time was about 31,200 MW.31 The total operational capacity of 
the three major utilities in California in 1999 was 41,749 MW.32 
Whether it was due to so-called "planned maintenance", 
unplanned maintenance, or outright gaming of the system, the 
December prices and alert were more a result of the imbalance 
between supply and demand rather than the absolute inadequacy 
of supply. 
Because the issue is related to an imbalance, not an absolute 
lack of supply, as well as transmission congestion, the solution is 
not simply increasing supply. Indeed, the December blackout 
demonstrates that a mismatch can occur even when potential 
supply is 50% greater than demand, including non-utilities and 
imports. The solution is control over supply, not the amount of 
supply, and the efficient distribution of electricity. It may not be 
just a coincidence that once the California Attorney General and 
the State Legislature began to put heavy investigative pressure 
on the withholding of capacity that the energy crisis began to 
abate.33 
Centralizing control in the state or in a regulated monopoly is 
one answer to the imbalance. California indeed had regulated 
monopolies before and returning to that regime was one choice 
not seriously considered by Governor Davis. Another approach is 
30 See Christian Berthelsen & Scott Winokur, Soaring Electric Use More 
Fiction Than Fact; Chronicle investigation finds power companies manipulate 
data to excuse their towering rates, The S.F. Chron. Al (Mar. 11,2001); see also 
CEC, Wholesale Electricity Price Review (Dec. 2000) 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/wepr/2000-121index.html> (accessed Mar. 
7,2002). 
31 CEC, Statewide Average Daily forced or Scheduled Megawatts Off-Line by 
Month <http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/1999-
2001_monthly_ofOine.html> (accessed Feb. 14, 2002). 




33 See George Skelton, Lockyer Prefers Action over Talk in Power Crisis, L.A. 
Times A3 (Apr. 2, 2001); see also Carl Ingram, Senate Panel Lashes Out at 2 
Energy firms; Hearings: Lawmakers hold Enron and Mirant in contempt for 
refusing to help in pricing probe, L.A. Times Al (June 29, 2001) (discussing the 
various efforts taken by the investigative committee to resolve the energy crisis 
in California). 
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to literally give power to the people, creating a climate where 
Californians put solar or wind power on their homes, 
governmental buildings and businesses so they are in control and 
electricity need not be distributed over transmission lines. 
Efforts to bolster efficiency and conservation also reduce the 
stranglehold of centralized power sources. 
Amazingly Davis, for all of his bluster about illegal price 
activity by out of state companies, never seemed to consider any 
approach that would significantly divest or diversify generation 
from, as Governor Davis put it, "the pirate generators and power 
brokers who are gouging California consumers."34 Davis in effect 
preserved the deregulated ownership of power capacity in 
centralized fossil fuel power plants.3s 
The net result is that the same economic structure that 
contributed to the blackouts remains in effect. Private 
companies with incentives to raise prices to increase profits 
continue to control power generation in California. Power 
generation is dominated by centralized fossil fuel generators and 
transmission upgrades or capacity is on the back burner. 
Further, to the extent increased prices were a result of 
volatility in natural gas prices,36 Davis' approach only further 
exacerbates the potential problem. His executive orders that 
were directed toward speeding up power plant licensing could 
only benefit natural gas producers, as environmental laws now 
prohibit or discourage other sources of fossil fuel or nuclear 
power in California. These facilities already have distribution 
infrastructure in place that have been paid for by ratepayers for 
decades, and therefore have an advantage over other 
technologies such as decentralized solar or wind. Davis' token 
subsidies for alternatives pales in comparison to the inherent 
subsidies now in place for centralized fossil fuel electrical 
generation. 
The biggest concern in this article is that the California 
response to the crisis led by Governor Davis had significant 
34 Thomas Hargrove, Energy crisis edicts issued, Regulators 'soft-cap' prices; 
Davis furious, Ventura County Star Al (Ventura County, Cal.) (Dec. 16, 2000). 
35 See Bernadette Tansey, The Energy Crunch; A Year Later; Deregulation 
(sort of) lives on in state; Future contours of electricity system still subject to 
changes, The S.F. Chron. Al (Dec. 25, 2001) (reporting the continued reliance 
on deregulated private sources of energy). 
36 See Martin, supra n. 27 (quoting the following "soaring natural gas prices, 
a dearth of hydroelectric power from the Northwest and scores of power plants 
shuttered for maintenance created the unstable market"). 
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consequences for environmental justice. Because he undermines 
environmental justice for the sake of a policy that fails to address 
the underlying problems of the crisis, he makes more dramatic 
the fragile nature of this new doctrine in a time of crisis. 
V. CALIFORNIA'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE 
Environmental justice has evolved as a policy doctrine in law 
beginning with President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 of 
February 11, 1994.37 The accompanying Memorandum,38 
suggested implementing the Order through enforcement of two 
key statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")39 
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 Soon thereafter, 
the Council on Environmental Quality issued its Environmental 
Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy 
Act.41 The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
("USEPA") followed in April 1998 with its Final Guidance for 
Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA 
Compliance Analysis. 42 
USEPA took the lead among federal agencies in proposing 
specific guidelines for implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act as a key strategy for establishing environmental justice. In 
2000, it adopted two related documents detailing how it would 
evaluate Title VI complaints-the Draft Revised Guidance for 
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging 
Permits (Draft revised Investigation Guidance) and its Draft Title 
VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering 
Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient 
Guidance}. 43 
37 See 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
38 See William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12998- Federal Actions to Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 
30 Wkly. Compo Pres. Doc. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4345 (1994). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d). 
41 See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Justice Guidance 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Dec. 10, 1997) 
<http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepalregs/ej/ej.pdf> (accessed Mar. 5, 2002). 
42 U.S. EPA, Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in 
EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis (1998) (stating that the primary goal of 
NEPA is to make certain that federal agencies while in pursuit of their missions 
do not fail to consider the effects of their actions on the environment). 
43 U.S. EPA, Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients 
Administering Environmental Permitting Programs <Draft Recipient Guidance) 
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California, in response to these federal initiatives, soon 
followed with its own environmental justice statute. Governor 
Davis signed legislation adopting a California environmental 
justice policy on October 6, 1999. The Solis bill provided in part: 
"[E]nvironmental justice" means the fair treatment of 
people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the 
development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. ~ 
A key principle in environmental justice is public participation. 
In 1991, the seminal First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington D.C. included 
as one of its principles of environmental justice lithe right to 
participate as equal partners at every level of decision~making 
including needs assessment, planning, implementation, 
enforcement and evaluation."45 
The Executive Order and the accompanying Memorandum 
emphasized public participation. The Order at § 1~103 required 
each federal agency to develop as part of its environmental 
strategy "public participation practices" that "ensure greater 
public participation."46 The Memorandum called for each federal 
agency to "provide opportunities for community input in the 
NEPA process... including improving the accessibility of 
meetings, crucial documents, and notices. "47 
The EPA has given particular emphasis to public participation, 
to the extent that a Title VI violation could be found on public 
participation grounds alone.48 The EPA has even proposed 
and Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative 
Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 
Fed. Reg. 39650-39654 (June 27, 2000) (explaining the purpose of the 
documents for clarifying Title VI compliance requirements for citizens and 
agencies). 
44 Cal. Govt. Code § 65040.12 (e). 
45 Race, Poverty and the Environment, Fall 1991 at 31-32 
<http://www.urbanhabitatprogram.org/publications.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 
W~ ~ ~ 
<http://www.webofcreation.org/educationipolicystatementsicolor.htm> (accessed 
Mar. 7, 2002). 
46 See USDA Forest Service, Federal Actwns to Address Environmental 
Justice In Minority Populatrons and Low-Income PopuLations 
<http://www.fs.fed.usIlandlenvjust.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002). 
47Id. 
48 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 39658 (ensuring that the public, who will be ultimately 
impacted by the agency decisions, are involved early on in the process so that 
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revising its public involvement policy for the first time in 19 
years in response to environmental justice concerns.49 
California also emphasized public participation. The 
California EPA (IICal EPAII) is required to assure fair treatment 
in all of its activities, including taking steps to lI[elnsure greater 
public participation in the Agency's development, adoption, and 
implementation of environmental regulations and policies.1I50 
Prior to the energy cnSlS, the CEC first addressed 
environmental justice in a case involving the siting of a new 
power plant in Bayview-Hunters Point in 1996.51 While the 
Commission rejected the environmental justice challenge on the 
substantive merits, it accepted that it was obligated to comply 
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act as an agency partially 
funded by federal money. 52 Subsequently the staff has generated 
an internal policy for addressing environmental justice 
concerns.53 
Governor Davis implemented his initiative to increase 
generation by demolishing public participation in facility siting. 
Normally, the CEC engages in at least a yearlong process before 
a power plant can be sited.54 In the usual contested case the 
Commission takes at least eighteen months or longer.55 
Power plants potentially impact all environmental media, air, 
water and soil, and therefore require a complex and 
comprehensive environmental analysis. Power plants are 
complicated machines that need to be assessed as to land use 
requirements, seismic safety, hazardous materials use and waste 
discharge, public health, impact to aquatic or land based flora 
their concerns are properly addressed) [hereinafter "Draft Recipient Guidance"). 
49Id. at 82335-82345. 
50 See Cal EPA, PRC 72000(c) Mission for Programs, Policies and Standards 
<http://www.arb.ca.govlbluebooklBBOllPRCI72000.htm> (accessed Jan. 10, 
2002). 
51 CEC, S.F. Energy Company Cogeneration Project, Application for 
certification (94-AFC-1) (1994). 
52 Alan Ramo, Hunters Point: Energy Development Meets Environmental 
Justice, Environmental Law News, Vol. 5, No.1, State Bar of California 
Environmental Law Section at 28 (Spring 1996). 
53 See CEC, Staff Approach to Environmental Justice for Power Plant 
Licensing Cases <http://www.energy.ca.gov/env-
justice/stafCenv ~ustice_approach.html> (updated Apr. 12, 2002). 
54 Cal. Pub.Res. Code § 25540.6. 
55 An example of a case exceeding 12 months is the Potrero Power Plant 
Project (00-AFC-4) at 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/potrero/index.html> (accessed Feb. 14, 
2002). 
2002] CALIFORNIA'S ENERGY CRISIS 15 
and fauna, among other issues.56 The process is thus approved 
under state law to be a certified program equivalent to an 
environmental impact report process under the California 
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), and similar to a NEPA 
Environmental Impact Statement.57 
The normal twelve-month process includes at least six months 
of discovery, including information requests (interrogatories) 
from all parties. The Commission staff is expected to produce a 
preliminary and final staff assessment that resembles an 
environmental impact report over a seven-month period. At least 
three months are devoted to analyzing the assessments, 
preparing testimony and conducting an evidentiary hearing. 
Normally the Commission within the next two months would 
produce a proposed decision, which would Illl1D.lC an 
environmental impact report, allow a thirty-day comment period, 
and then issue a final decision. 58 
Soon after the crisis began, the State Legislature passed 
legislation creating a six-month process pursuant to AB 970, 
presumably for facilities that do not potentially cause adverse 
environmental impacts, much like a negative declaration under 
CEQA or a Finding of No Significant Impact under NEPA. Six 
months is brutally short for a power plant review. Apparently, it 
was not short enough. Thus, the legislature in AB 970 and later 
in SB 28X; adopted a four-month procedure for simple cycle 
power plants requiring a finding of no impacts and that they be 
in service within the year 2002.59 Even then, the Governor 
wanted to speed up the time for peaking power plants.GO The 
Energy Commission, under the authority of the Governor's 
executive order, adopted a twenty-one day procedure for peaker 
56 See Draft Recipient Guidance, supra n. 43. 
57 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25541.5; see also Mountain Lion Foundation us. 
Fish and Game Com., 16 Cal. 4th 105 for certified program requirements. 
58 See Model Timeline in CEC, Public Adviser's Presentation on Siting 
Process at <http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl1999.04-
15_public_adviser.html> (accessed Feb. 27, 2002). 
59 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 25550, 25550.5, 25552; see also 20 Cal. Admin. 
Code Title 20, § 2021 (2002). 
60 "Peaker power plants are usually employed to produce power during the 
peak demand period of the day or when there is not enough energy available in 
the state's energy system to meet statewide demand. Simple-cycle peaker 
plants are typically twice as polluting as combined cycle baseload plants. II 
POWER Against the PEOPLE? Mouing Beyond Crisis Planning in California 
Energy, A Report of the Latino Issues Forum, November 2001 at 2 
<http://www.lif.org> (accessed Mar. 6, 2002). 
16 ALBANY LAW ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK JRNL. [Vol. 7 
power plants on line by September 30, 2001. 61 
Six months is considerably short for the public to participate. 
The CEC staff must submit its preliminary environmental 
analysis within seventy-five days. The staff must then submit its 
final report within forty-five days, presumably after noticing a 
workshop, holding it, obtaining and reviewing public comments 
and then preparing a report. Other public agencies must 
comment within twenty-five days of receiving the staffs initial 
report. That leaves fifteen days for everyone to prepare for 
evidentiary hearings, whom have little room for more than a day 
of hearings. Twenty days thereafter, the Commission must issue 
its proposed decision. No later than fifteen days, comments are 
due on the proposed decision and fifteen days thereafter the 
Commission must make a final decision. 
A four-month process makes a six-month process seem 
leisurely. To qualify for the four-month procedure, a facility 
must be a simple cycle natural gas facility, be online and 
operational by December 31, 2002, use BACT to control air 
emissions, not have significant adverse public health or 
environmental impacts, not be a major stationary source, and not 
convert to a combined cycle or cogeneration facility within three 
years, among other requirements.62 
These restrictions make the four-month process somewhat 
more reasonable, unless one believes a facility does not qualify 
and wants to dispute the application. At that point, for a power 
plant licensing process, administrative review proceeds at a 
breakneck pace. Under the four-month procedure, the staff 
normally makes a recommendation as to whether the facility is 
qualified for a four-month review within fifteen days, with a 
hearing normally held about ten days later. Thus, the staffs 
environmental assessment is not even filed until thirty-five days 
later. Within the next ten days, the staff holds a public workshop 
61 See CEC, California Emergency Siting Peaker Power Plant Permitting 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/peakers> (updated Dec. 19, 2001). 
Executive Order D-28-01 Mar. 2001 authorized the Energy Commission to 
waive all timelines for facilities covered by D-22-01, D-24-01 and D-25-01 and 
specifically authorized emergency procedures for peakers able to be online by 
September 30, 2001, setting the stage for the 21 day process ordered by the 
Energy Commission. D-40-01 issued on June 11, 2001, authorized facilities to 
operate beyond any state permit limit if necessary and if a mitigation payment 
was paid to the State. 
62 See infra Section VI regarding the attempt by the Energy Commission to 
jettison these restrictions on the four-month process. 
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and ten days after that, evidentiary hearings begin before the 
Commission. Twenty days later the Commission proposes a 
decision and ten days thereafter the Commission makes a final 
decision.63 
The twenty-one day process was truly devoid of any pretense of 
meaningful participation. Under that process, a public hearing 
could occur within two days of a public notice regarding the 
project. Other public agencies are given only two weeks to 
comment on the proposal. The CEC staff may have as little as 
two days to develop their own analysis after that, with the 
commission issuing a final decision without any comment period 
as short as two days later.54 
Any member of the public participating in these kinds of 
intensive regulatory proceedings will barely have enough time to 
thoroughly review each document, solicit and obtain expert 
assistance, prepare comments or testimony, and then participate 
in a hearing in any kind of meaningful matter. Timing is critical 
for public participation. The EPA in its Recipient Guidance calls 
for early public involvement, even before the permitting process 
formally begins.65 The EPA has also noted that not only must 
public participation begin early, it must be allowed to occur ,vith 
sufficient time to make comments effective and meaningful, 
including thirty days for comment on documents and forty-five 
days where there is a public hearing, extending to sixty days or 
more for complex documents or projects.66 
General California public participation guidelines are 
consistent with the proposed federal guidelines. Comment 
periods on negative declarations (equivalent to a Finding of No 
Significant Impact under NEPA) issued by state agencies are to 
last at least thirty days. For a draft environmental impact report, 
state agencies usually allow for forty-five days.67 These 
guidelines are applicable to agencies implementing CEQA such 
63 See CEC,4-Month Power Plant Licensing Process Workshop for CPA 
Bidders, September 28, 2001 at 19 <http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl4-
month-processl2001-09-28 (RICHINSPRESENT.PDF) 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcasesl2001-05-31> 
(LICENSE_SCHEDULE.PDF) (accessed Feb. 27, 2002). 
54 See CEC, California Emergency Power Plant Permitting, Table ill 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslpeakersldocumentsl2001 
-03-15_EMERGENCY_MEMO.PDF> Gast updated Mar. 13, 2002). 
65 See Cal. Govt. Code § 39658. 
66 See Goal4(e) in U.S. EPA, Draft Public Involvement Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82335, 82342 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
67 14 C.C.R 15073(a), 15105. 
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as the CEC. 
Under these guidelines, the CEC's process flunks. Under all of 
the processes, the public is excluded until an application for 
certification is filed. The twenty-one day process does not 
pretend to meet even the minimal requirements of a thirty-day 
comment period, let alone the forty-five days when there is a 
hearing. In the four-month process, hearings on a project's 
eligibility for this speeded up process, evidentiary hearings on 
the merits of the project, and hearings on the Commission's 
proposed decision are all within thirty days of key documents 
being released for public comment or review. The Commission 
requires comments on its proposed decision within ten days 
before a hearing, and a decision is issued ten days thereafter. 
The six-month process is little better. Evidentiary hearings 
are held within ten days of the filing of the final staff assessment. 
A hearing on the Commission's Proposed Decision is held within 
ten days of its release to the public. 
Only the twelve-month process begins to allow sufficient time 
for public participation. Even then, evidentiary hearings are 
normally within thirty days of the final staff assessment release, 
not forty-five days as suggested by the US EPA in its Draft 
Public Involvement Policy. A hearing on the Commission's 
proposed decision is held within fifteen days. 
Public participation, even if given all the time needed, is not 
sufficient to provide environmental justice if it is not meaningful. 
If the decision-makers are a stacked deck, controlled by politics 
as opposed to law and science, those without traditional political 
power will lose out, further exacerbating environmental injustice. 
In California, the CEC is a body appointed by the Governor. 
Governor Davis actively interceded when it appeared a power 
plant proposal was in jeopardy. In San Jose, the City Council at 
one point voted to oppose a new CalPine power plant. Governor 
Davis soon called for its passage, and eventually the City Council 
acceded to the Governor's pressure. Within the Commission, the 
San Jose Mercury reported that staff analysts' reports were 
rewritten, and those analysts who would not allow their 
testimony to be changed were taken off the project. The CEC 
then approved the project.68 
68 See Levey, Calpine wins approval for new project, San Jose Mercury News, 
Sept. 25, 2001; Wilson, San Jose Council Gives Green Light to generating plant; 
VOTE REVERSAL: Officials Pressured to OK project, The S.F. ehron. Al (June 
6, 2001); see also Levey, Officials rejected Calpine criticism: Commission 
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Recently, in another case, the CEC Chair defended his agency's 
consideration of an expansion of a power plant in a low income, 
predominantly African-American community in San Francisco 
before an angry workshop audience. He stated, "[O]ne of the 
great benefits of new power plants statewide is that we're going 
to shut down the old polluting power plants" and "we're for 
modern efficient power plants."69 Since the Commission was not 
proposing to shut down the older power plants in the community 
but merely expand an existing facility, community members 
attending the workshop were not pleased, to say the least. 
The Commission also attempted to curtail what had been 
extensive rights by members of the public to intervene as a party 
in siting cases.70 Originally the Commission proposed to make 
evidentiary hearings discretionary and allow the Commission's 
presiding member to rigidly control an intervenor's right to 
present evidence and examine or cross-examine witnesses. These 
modifications would put the rights of interveners at the discretion 
of the presiding member of the siting case.71 That effort now 
appears to have been beaten back after a large coalition of 
community groups protested in comments and at a hearing. It 
demonstrates, however, the inclination of the Commission to 
curtail public participation, even without any evidence that 
procedural due process safeguards had improperly denied even 
one MW of capacity to the State. 
Community groups have nevertheless been successfully 
asserting environmental justice challenges, but only over the 
resistance of state authorities. In not one case has the 
Commission agreed, except when the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District refused to give a permit to a large 
uncontrolled peaker plant in. the middle of a proposed park 
area.72 Community groups have had to sidestep the Commission, 
pushed for positive report, San Jose Mercury News (Apr. 14, 2001). 
69 See August 13, 200l-Potrero Power Plant Project Committee Conference 
Transcript. (Adobe Acrobat PDF file, 155 pages, 196 kilobytes) RT 37, 38 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslpotreroldocumentsrmdex.html> (accessed 
Mar. 7, 2002). 
70 Under 20 C.C.R. § 1712(a) (stating that "any person may petition to 
intervene" in a siting case). 
71 See Docket Number 0l-SIT-1 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitinglrulemakingldocumentsrmdex.html> (accessed 
Mar. 7, 2002). 
72 La Jolla Baldwin Peaking Project (Ol-EP-ll); see also the list of withdrawn 
projects at <http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslwithdrawn.html> (accessed 
Jan. 4, 2002). 
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reaching out to city governments or, in one case, using a 
referendum.73 In San Francisco, an ordinance was adopted 
preventing the City from approving or agreeing to facilitate a 
fossil fuel power plant unless it reduced pollution, replaced older 
more polluting facilities and provided community mitigation.74 
Nevertheless, eleven twenty-one day peaker process facilities and 
fourteen twelve-month power plants have been approved since 
1999. 
VI. !'EAKER PLANTS: A Focus OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 
The most pernicious element of the effort to expand fossil fuel 
capacity in California is the reliance upon so-called peaker 
plants. These simple cycle power plants often have little or no 
pollution controls. Some plants already in existence, including 
those proposed for expanded operations, burn other fuels such as 
distillate oil, which is far more polluting than natural gas. 
The Davis administration utilized these smaller plants to 
quickly upgrade capacity, either by building new ones or freeing 
existing ones from permits that limited their operations, due to 
their lack of controls and excessive pollution. Under Davis' 
executive orders, the Commission succeeded in implementing the 
twenty-one day review process for peakers that could be online by 
September 30, 2001. An attempt to further ease the restrictions 
for other peakers under the emergency four-month process was 
reversed only after a rapid mobilization by community 
organizations and larger environmental organizations.75 
The ISO, at the urging of the administration, also proposed 
that older peakers that burn distillate oil be freed from permit 
restrictions on hours of operations. For example, the ISO 
directed the Mirant company to operate its peakers located at its 
San Francisco Potrero power plant whenever requested by the 
ISO, or whenever necessary for Mirant to fulfill any contractual 
obligations for electricity. The peakers together totaled 150 MW 
73 See Soller, The State, the New Nimbys Are Taking Back Their Backyards-
and Their Air, 6 L.A. Times M6 (Mar. 18, 2001). 
74 S.F., Cal., Human Health and Environmental Protections for New Electric 
Generation, Ordinance 124-01 (May 29, 2001) 
75 State Ends Fast Tracking for Some Power Plants, Ventura County Star 
A18 (Dec. 6, 2001); see also CEC, Final Staff Draft Resolution 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/4-month_processl200 1-12-
05_draftresolution.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002) (rescinding resolution 01-
1017-02 and subjecting all power plants to review in accord with the California 
Environmental Quality Air). 
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with permits that allowed them to be operated for 877 hours, no 
more than about one month over a year. 
The permit requirements, however, were incorporated into a 
federal Title V permit issued pursuant to the Federal Clean Air 
Act based upon limitations on hours of operations in the federally 
approved State Implementation Plan. That is, these were federal 
requirements. The US EPA and the local Bay Area Air Quality 
Management District ("BAAQMD") tried to immunize the 
violation by signing adminjstrative enforcement agreements 
calling for mitigation payments in lieu of compliance. However, 
even FERC eventually balked at the idea that an ISO could 
direct a company to violate its federal permit.76 
Further exacerbating the problem, Mirant's units were near a 
predominantly low-income African-American community. Once 
the US EPA, the BAAQMD and Mirant announced the 
enforcement agreements to the public after they were a fait 
accompli, community organizations were outraged. As soon as 
the permit limits were exceeded, three of these groups sued.77 
Mirant soon agreed to stop operating in violation of its permit 
and signed a proposed consent decree requiring it to comply ,vith 
Mirant's permit. However, even then, the Davis administration 
would not relent. Its Air Resources Board ("ARB"), in an unusual 
maneuver for an air pollution agency, tried at the last minute to 
delay entry of the consent decree that only enforced the 
company's permit air pollution limits. The ARB claimed to be 
concerned with reliability issues; however, the federal judge was 
not persuaded and eventually entered the decree.78 
Potrero's situation is unfortunately representative of a pattern 
in California, according to a recent study by the Latino Issues 
Forum, entitled "POWER Against the PEOPLE: Moving Beyond 
Crisis Planning in California Energy."79 The study looked at 
eighteen planned or approved power plants, mostly peakers 
(seventeen) in California since deregulation. The study 
76 San Diego Gas & Electric Company (2001) 96 F.E.R.C. P 61,117 (Mirant 
Request for Clarification). 
77 Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates et aL v. Mirant Potrero LLC 
et al., (N.D. Cal. 2001) Case No. 01-cv-02348; see also Gordon. Potrero Hill 
Power Plant Hit By 2 Lawsuits; Neighbors City Ask Court To Cut Back Hours of 
Operation, The S.F. Chron. Al3 (June 20, 2001). 
78 See court docket through PACER database at 
<http://pacer.cand.uscourts.gov/> (accessed Mar. 6, 2002). 
79 See Ramo supra n. 52 (stating that power plants in California are often 
sited in neighborhood populated by minorities). 
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demonstrated that these facilities are being disproportionately 
sited in communities of color. Two-thirds of the plants contained 
fifty percent or more people of color within a six-mile radius from 
the plant. Latinos were highly over-represented, followed by 
Blacks.so 
While there may be many plausible reasons for 
disproportionate siting, such as the location of existing facilities 
such as switchyards and natural gas pipelines, land use zoning, 
or the location of open space suitable for a large power plant, the 
whole approach is questionable given studies suggesting there 
may be alternatives beyond fossil fuel. For example, 
Communities for a Better Environment ("CBE") recently 
analyzed energy needs in San Francisco, isolated on a peninsula 
with only one transmission corridor available, and determined 
that fossil fuel could actually be reduced from the current 
proposed 903 MW to as few as 167 MW if the transmission 
system was upgraded and solar, efficiency, wind and other green 
alternatives were pursued.sl Professor Karina Garbesi of 
Hayward State University in California, in a report prepared for 
community groups commenting on Mirant's Potrero power plant 
licensing in San Francisco, demonstrated that even in fog 
shrouded San Francisco there was a potential of at least 240 to 
600 MW from a commitment to solar power and another 300 MW 
could result from incorporating efficiency in construction.s2 
The Davis administration never seriously pursued these 
alternatives. To make renewables, a viable option required 
reversing the impact of deregulation, including a substantial 
commitment of state subsidies. The Legislature, in 2000, finally 
authorized a substantial commitment to conservation efforts for 
one year in the amount of $909 million dollars. However, these 
emergency appropriations do not include any future 
commitments to DSM, which averaged $500 million dollars a 
80 Id. at 10 (featuring statistics which support fmding that power plants are 
located in minority neighborhoods). 
81 Communities for a Better Environment, Power & Justice: Electricity, 
environment, race, class and health in San Francisco, California, November, 
2001 <http://www.cbecal.org/publications/poweIjustice.htm> (accessed Mar. 6, 
2002). 
82 Karina Garbesi and Emily Bartholmew, The Potential for Solar Electricity 
Generation in San Francisco (June 1, 2001); see also Green and Garbesi, The 
Potential to Reduce the City of San Francisco's Electricity Demand Through 
Implementation of Commercially Available Energy Efficient Technologies, July 
1, 2001 <http://www.Californiasolar.center/pdfs/sfpv.pdf> (accessed Mar. 6, 
2002). 
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year. It will take that kind of continued commitment to achieve 
the potential suggested in the Garbesi studies on a statewide 
basis. Furthermore, the utilities in a competitive market have 
an incentive to sell as much electricity as possible, destroying the 
prior incentive to support efficiency. Thus $72M in funds 
allocated for utility DSM programs was left unspent in 1998 and 
1999.83 
The Legislature on September 30, 2000, also passed AB 995 
and SB 1194 authorizing an additional expenditure of $675M 
from 2002 through 2007 for renewable energy sources. This 
measure will not increase the amount of support per year 
provided in the original deregulation statutes. However, it does 
allocate more funding to new capacity. In addition, the 
legislature also adopted AB 29, which included $95 million over 
two years as an incentive, a short-term increase of 33% over a 
two-year period. 
However, as discussed above, these short-term measures 
remain relatively modest compared to the historic subsidy given 
to fossil fuel generation and the far more significant amount for 
stranded costs, and thus cannot offset the push towards new 
fossil fuel capacity supported by California. The bottom line is 
that Davis' crisis management approach has made California's 
new generation capacity primarily natural gas.84 California 
provided some support for renewables and conservation, however 
the program as a whole has disproportionately pushed 
centralized fossil fueled power plants into communities of color. 
VII. LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
It is striking that within one year of adopting an 
environmental justice policy, California officials quickly 
overlooked environmental justice as soon as there was a crisis. It 
is not as if the Legislature had not expressed its views regarding 
the need to incorporate environmental justice in energy siting 
regardless of this fact for instance in California Public Resources 
Codes sections 25550 (g) and 25550.5(g).85 Yet disproportionate 
83 See Cal Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. 
84 A list of new power plants approved since 1999 by the CEC is at 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcaseslapproved.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2002). 
- 85 See CAL Pub_ Res. §25550 (g) (stating that: "With respect to a thermal 
power plant and related facilities reviewed under the process established by 
this chapter, it shall be shown that the thermal power plant and related 
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siting with inadequate public participation processes became the 
norm. 
Furthermore, California's energy crisis policy makers did not 
include representatives of the communities most impacted. 
California's chief energy advisors themselves criticized the ISO 
for its dominance by industry interests: 
Many board members sell power or own generation facilities 
and therefore have an interest in keeping prices high. None of 
them has a duty to serve the California public interest. The ISO 
board is also self-perpetuating: it appoints its own members, 
subject only to approval by the EOB and the FERC.86 
In fact, many of Governor Davis' closest advisors were from the 
energy industry, investing in fossil fuel companies while 
determining where the state should obtain its energy.87 It is not 
therefore surprising that the crisis policy relied upon fossil fuel 
power plants that were disproportionately sited in communities 
of color. 
Another social dynamic may have been at play. Whether 
unconsciously,88 negligently,89 or through the "paths" or "scripts" 
of institutional racism.90 Racism can work without intention or 
through callous neglect.91 Thus federal civil rights law bans not 
only intentional discrimination by statute, but through 
regulation, unintentional discrimination whose impact IS 
facilities complies with all regulations adopted by the commission that ensure 
that an application addresses disproportionate impacts in a manner consistent 
with Section 65040.12 of the Government Code." Section 25550.5 (g) 
applicability to repowering an existing facility is similar). 
86 See Cal. Assembly 1890, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. at § 5. 
87 See Nissenbaum, Another Adviser Linked to Possible Conflict; Davis Asks 
Watchdog Agency to Investigate, San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 25, 2001, State 
and Regional News (discussing Davis' request that the California Fair Political 
Practices Commission investigate conflicts of interest for 11 members of its 
energy team after Davis had fired 5 members who owned stock in power 
companies); see also State Officials Ethics in Question, San Jose Mercury News, 
Aug. 15, 2001, State and Regional News (discussing potential conflicts of 
interest of Chair of Energy Commission and others). 
88 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987) (showing that institutional 
racism is even present in a kindergarten classroom). 
89 Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U.Pa. L. Rev. 899 (1993). 
90 Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 Yale L. J. 1717 (2000). 
91 See discussion of unconscious racism as a more typical source of 
environmental racism in today's society in Evans, Challenging the Racism in 
Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1219 
(1998). 
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disparate and unwarranted.92 The USEPA therefore 
recommends staff training as a key activity to assure compliance 
with Title VI.93 
The failure of California's energy planning to avoid 
disproportionate siting of fossil fuel plants or the erosion of 
public participation rights suggests that environmental justice 
was not a key. concern of decision-makers. Explicit statutory 
policies were' insufficient, as were any disincentives from 
potential lawsuits, which now seem limited to only the most 
blatant acts of intentional discrimination.94 
Beyond environmental justice, California's energy crisis makes 
clear other perils of crisis management. Once emergency powers 
are granted to government, it is difficult to take them away. 
Governor Davis and his administration are now resisting calling 
an end to the crisis, even though the State Senate, the CEC and 
widespread media have declared an end to the crisis.95 The 
emergency order is still in effect and will remain so unless there 
is a change of heart in the administration. 
Further, the decisions made in a crisis may outlast the crisis. 
Unless there is an escape clause or sunset provision, one may 
have to tolerate these decisions for a long time. California is now 
begging for people to buy electricity so that electricity contracted 
for at relatively high prices (though below peak prices) can be 
somewhat reimbursed.96 It is increasingly dependent upon 
natural gas, a source of serious price fluctuations, and mired in 
centralized fossil fuel generation owned by out of state 
generators. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
During California's energy crisis, the administration and 
legislature erred in eviscerating environmental justice and 
92 See generally 40 C.F.R § 7.35(b) (showing Title VI regulations); see also 
Mank, Title VI, The Law of Environmental Justice Ch. 2 (M. Gerrard, ed. 
1999). 
93 See 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 at 39657 (showing Draft Recipient Guidance). 
94 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); S. Camden Citizens in 
Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001); 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 26822; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
95 Lynda Gledhill, Crisis Dims, But Davis' Powers Longer; Legislators, 
Environmentalists Say Broad Authority Invites Abuse, The S.F. Cbron. AI (Dec. 
3,2001). 
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maintaining a privatized energy system still capable of 
disruption. Centralized fossil fuel power plants were 
disproportionately sited in communities of color without 
adequate public participation as transmission upgrades and 
green alternatives were downplayed. Emergency actions and 
powers were adopted without sufficient guarantees they would 
expire once the crisis abated. Government prior to a crisis needs 
to assure that environmental justice becomes an explicit and 
conscious responsibility of policy makers, and once the crisis 
begins, that emergency actions and policies maintain this 
commitment and incorporate sunset provisions or escape clauses. 
